We present a generalization of Segerberg's onion semantics for belief revision, in which the linearity of the spheres need not occur. The resulting logic is called broccoli logic. We provide a minimal relational logic, introducing a new neighborhood semantics operator. We then show that broccoli logic is a well-known conditional logic, the Burgess-Veltman minimal conditional logic.
Belief revision is the study of theory change in which a set of formulas is ascribed to an agent as a belief set revisable in the face of new information (Cf. [6, 11] ). A dominant paradigm in belief revision is the so-called AGM paradigm, which describes a functional notion of revision (cf. [1]). A natural semantics in terms of sphere systems (cf. [8] ) was given by Grove in [7] and a logical axiomatization was extensively studied by Segerberg (cf. [12] and the forthcoming [13] ). The resulting logic is called "dynamic doxastic logic" (DDL). A generalization of the AGM approach in which revision is taken to be relational rather than functional was first studied by Lindström and Rabinowicz (cf. [9] ), and was pursued in [4] . Their motivation was to formalize cases in which an agent may obtain incomparable belief sets after revision with new information. In this paper, we will pursue this generalization and propose a relational belief revision logic. We call the resulting logic "broccoli logic" (BL) and the type of revision it depicts "broccoli revision". As it turns out, and this will be the main result of this paper, BL already exists, in the guise of what we call "minimal conditional logic" (MCL for short), studied by Burgess and Veltman (cf. Burgess [3] and Veltman [14] ).
In section 1, we outline onion semantics and the intended generalization to BL. In section 2, we give a minimal relational logic (MRL) with its complete proof system. The semantics of this logic is in effect a neighborhood semantics (cf. [5] ), but we will interpret it in terms of revision instead. In section 3, we will propose ways of expending MRL to get a complete proof system for BL and we will point at a major difficulty in this task, namely to provide a so-called arrowcondition for generalized selection functions. Finally, section 4 will show how the quest for a generalized selection function, with the promised difficulties inherent in the project, is avoidable by showing that BL is equivalent to MCL.
Onion and broccoli logics
This section presents the onion and broccoli semantics. We give definitions of onion and broccoli models and provide the semantics for the broccoli modal operators.
Onions
An onion is a linearly ordered sphere system that satisfy the limit condition. More precisely, Definition 1.1. Let U be a nonempty set. An onion O ⊆ P(U) is a linearly ordered set of subsets of U satisfying the following condition (the limit condition): for all X ⊆ U :
The limit condition states that every set intersecting an onion intersects a smallest element. Let O • X = {Y ∈ O : Y ∩ X ∅}. We use the notation ' Zµ(O • X)' to express that Z is a minimal element of the onion O intersecting X, i.e., for all Y ∈ O • X, Z ⊆ Y. The limit condition can succinctly be written as:
Broccoli semantics
We want to pursue a generalization of onion logic by dropping the requirement of linearity, thus generalizing the limit condition. Definition 1.2. Let U be a nonempty set. A broccoli flower B ⊆ P(U) is a set of subsets satisfying a generalized limit condition.
There are two ways to specify the generalized limit condition of definition 1.2.
Intuitively, a generalized limit condition states that every set intersecting a broccoli flower intersects every members of a set S of smallest elements of the flower. In the first case, the members of S are minimal sets of the broccoli that have a nonempty intersection with X. In the second case, the members of S have minimal intersection with X.
With a generalized limit condition in hand, it is meaningful to define counterfactual modalities. Two natural candidates for BL (with their respective dual) come to mind. Let '→' stand for the material conditional. The first modality says that ϕ → ψ holds throughout every minimal ϕ-sphere; the second says that ϕ → ψ is consistent with every minimal ϕ-sphere. We will follow Chellas [5] and write these two counterfactuals as the unary modalities [ϕ]ψ and [ϕ ψ. Definition 1.3. M = (U, {B u } u∈U , V) is a broccoli model if U is a set of worlds, {B u } u∈U is a family of broccoli flowers for each world u ∈ U satisfying either generalized limit condition, and V is a valuation assigning sets of worlds to propositions.
In what follows, we suppress the index u whenever it is clear from context. Definition 1.4. We say that ϕ is true at world u in a broccoli model M, written M, u ϕ iff (taking standard truth definition for the propositional and the Boolean cases): Here, as usual, |ϕ| = {u : M, u ϕ}. We call |ϕ| the associated proposition to ϕ.
These two modalities are meaningful with either generalized limit condition proposed above. Figure 1 illustrates the semantics of both operators.
Minimal relational logic
Our first goal is to get a logic that captures a notion of belief revision in which revision is relational rather than functional. That is, we want to allow for incomparable revisions with respect to a belief set. With that purpose in mind, we need a language that can express notions like "all sets obtained under revision by ϕ are ψ-sets" and "ψ is consistent with all sets obtained under revision by ϕ". In counterfactual terminology, the same claims read as "all minimal ϕ-sets are ψ-sets" and "all minimal ϕ-sets intersect ψ-sets". In this section, we introduce a minimal relational logic that captures the core of these ideas. Section 2.1 introduces the language and the semantics of this minimal logic. We will use intuitive interpretations of the semantics in terms of revision, but this is only to keep the motivation of the paper prominent. We give the axiomatization of the minimal logic in section 2.2 and prove it to be complete in section 2.3.
Language and semantics
We use a standard propositional language whose primitive Boolean connectives are negation ¬ and disjunction ∨, augmented with two modalities [ϕ]ψ and [ϕ ψ. • U is a nonempty set, the universe;
• R = {R |ϕ| : ϕ is a formula, R |ϕ| ⊆ U × P(U)}; and
Definition 2.2. Let M be a model and let w ∈ U. The truth-definition for atomic propositions, negations and disjunction is standard. We say that the formula ϕ is true at point u in a minimal relational model M, written M, u ϕ if :
The semantics of the modalities [ϕ] and [ϕ contains two levels of quantification and should be read in two stages: 1) the left bracket picks out a set of ϕ-subsets of the universe and 2) the right bracket evaluates where ψ is true in these subsets. Notice that the semantics given by minimal relational models is a neighborhood semantics (cf. [5] ). Indeed, the relation R is a relation between worlds and subsets of the universe. The modality [ϕ] is the usual neighborhood universal modality, but indexed with associated propositions |ϕ|. It comes with its dual modality ϕ with the obvious semantics. The interesting addition of our language is the modality [ϕ , which expresses that every set R |ϕ| -related to u satisfies ψ in at least one point. In neighborhood terminology, this modality expresses that every ϕ-neighborhood contains at least one ψ-point. This latter modality also come with its natural dual ϕ]. In the remainder of this paper, we shall no longer appeal to neighborhood semantics. We will instead provide an interpretation in terms of revision, but the reader who prefers to think in terms of neighborhood semantics is urged to do so and to see in what respect it is a generalization of this logic. Figure 2 presents a simple minimal relational model, in which the world u is R |ϕ| -related (illustrated with arrows) to the sets of worlds X and Y and such that ψ is true at every world of X and Y. Hence, according to the minimal semantics of definition 2.2, [ϕ]ψ is true at u. This is enough to illustrate the semantics of our minimal relational logic, but to give a motivation for pursuing this semantics, we illustrate its role in BL. Figure 3 depicts a broccoli flower consisting of two sets (doted lines) of which X and Y are subsets. Irrespectively of the generalized limit assumption ultimately adopted, assume that these two sets are minimal ϕ-sets (or that the sets X and Y have minimal |ϕ|-intersections). Our goal is to add restrictions on the relation R |ϕ| in order to get the sets X and Y as two minimal sets returned under revision by ϕ. This is illustrated in picture 4. In the picture on the left-hand-side, [ϕ] ψ is true at world u, since every set obtained under revision by ϕ is a ψ-sets. Similarly, [ϕ ψ is true at u in the right-hand-side picture, since ψ is consistent with every revision by ϕ.
We see the motivation of the minimal relational logic of the present section. In a full-blown BL, either additional restrictions on the relation R or so-called 'generalized selection functions' will play the role of selecting minimal revised sets. Once these sets are selected, the minimal relational logic of the present section will provide the logic to evaluate what holds in these sets. We will discuss selection function in section 3 below. For the remainder of this section, we will present the logic of minimal relational logic and prove completeness. Our goal is to get a firm grasp of the core of future expansion to BL.
Proof system
The following set of axioms and rules is complete with respect to onion selection models:
Axioms: 1 Axioms 5 is a monotonicity axiom for the modality ϕ]. Intuitively, if ψ is consistent with some revision by ϕ, then anything weaker than ψ is also consistent with some revision by ϕ. Finally, axiom 6 provides a minimal interaction between the modalities: If ψ is consistent with every revision by ϕ and there is a revision by ϕ such that θ is consistent, then there is a revision by ϕ such that both ψ and θ are consistent. Finally, axiom 7 says that if there is no revision by ϕ, then every [ϕ] formula holds vacuously. This is akin to saying that every necessary formula holds at en end-point in a Kripke model. Now, Suppose that ϕ]⊤ ∈ u for some u ∈ U. 2 Then, for every ψ ∈ u such that [ϕ ψ ∈ u, axiom 6 gives that ϕ](ψ ∧ ⊤) ∈ u. By monotonicity of ϕ] (axiom 5), ϕ]ψ ∈ u. Hence, if there is a revision by ϕ and if ψ is consistent with every revision by ϕ, then there is a least one revision by ϕ that witnesses the consistency of ψ. This is desirable for a belief revision logic.
Completeness
Soundness is a matter of routine. We show the soundness of axiom (6) and leave the others to the reader.
For the completeness part, let U L consists of all maximal L-consistent sets of formulas. For each formula ϕ, we define an accessibility relation R 1. for all x ∈ X, if [ϕ]ψ ∈ u, then ψ ∈ x; and 2. for every [ϕ ψ ∈ u, X contains at least one world v with ψ ∈ v.
The completeness of the proof system in section 2.2 follows from a standard truthlemma:
Lemma 2.4. For all u ∈ U
L and for all formula θ, θ ∈ u iff M, u θ.
We will give the proof of the truth-lemma once we have stated and proved the following crucial lemmas. Proof. Let [ϕ θ ∈ u, and let
(by the monotonicity axiom 5)
and this is a contradiction, since [ϕ θ ∈ u by assumption. Therefore, v − is consistent. Let v be a maximal extension of v − . For every θ i such that [ϕ θ i ∈ u, let w i be obtained from the above construction, and let
Then X satisfies conditions (1) and (2) and for every x ∈ X, α ∈ x. Proof. Assume ϕ ψ ∈ u. Then there is a maximal consistent set v such that ψ ∈ v. The proof that v exists is standard (see [2] , Lemma 4.20).
By corollary 2.6, for every formula α i , if [ϕ α i ∈ u, then the set w We are now ready for the proof of the truth-lemma. Finally, suppose that [ϕ ψ u, then ¬[ϕ ψ ∈ u. Hence, ϕ]¬ψ ∈ u (axiom 3). By lemma 2.5, there exists a subset X ⊆ U L such that R L |ϕ| uX and for every world x ∈ X, ¬ψ ∈ x. By inductive hypothesis, for every x ∈ X, M, x ¬ψ. Therefore, by truth-definition, M, u [ϕ ψ.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Thanks to axioms 5 and 7, if

Generalized selection functions
Selection functions are a natural level in between onion semantics and the general neighborhood models of the preceding section. A selection function takes a proposition p as an argument and return a segment from the set of closest pworlds (cf. [8] ). In this section, we show what properties a suitably generalized selection function should satisfy to play the same role as selection functions in onion semantics, and we point to the difficulties of the generalization. We start with selection functions for the original case of onion models.
Onions and selection functions
Definition 3.1. A function f : P(U) → P(U) is a selection function if it satisfies the following conditions, where X ⊆ U :
The third condition is called the arrow condition and is the source of the major difficulties in the original development of broccoli semantics.
Let U be a finite set and let F be a selection function on U. Let
Since U is finite, there is a smallest m such that S m+1 = S m . We leave to the reader to verify that the set O F = {S n : n < m} is an onion and that O F and F agree. 3 Hence, models for onions may be given in terms of selection functions. 
The complete logic for onions consists of the axioms (1), (2) , and (4) of section 2.2 together with the additional axioms (I), (M) and (A):
Axioms (I), (M) and (A) are obvious analogues of conditions (INC), (MON) and
(ARR) of definition 3.1. The total resulting system is almost Lewis's famous conditional logic VC, provided that we add an assumption of centrality (cf. [8, 10] ).
Broccoli and generalized selection functions
Now, consider the issue of generalizing this format in a non-linear broccoli setting.
(INC) and (MON) are easily generalized in BL to the following conditions, for all X, Y ⊆ U:
with the identical corresponding axioms (I) and (M A difficulty arises when attempting to generalize condition (ARR) in a similar fashion. The choice of the generalization depends on the generalized limit condition adopted. For example, a generalization of (ARR) that seems natural is:
but (ARR * ) holds only if we insisted on keeping the generalized limit condition 1 of section 1. 4 Now, only one half of (A) can be kept in BL, viz.
The other half makes a crucial appeal to linearity, as may be seen from the counter-model of picture 5. Furthermore, this counter-
It is an open question to find an appropriate axiom that corresponds to condition (ARR * ), or alternatively, to find an appropriate generalization of (ARR) that yields a generalized selection function for BL. This promises to be a difficult task. But instead of pursuing this enterprize further, we pause and see whether BL may not be obtained from an entirely different approach, viz. by showing that the logic already exists! The fact that it is is the third and final contribution of this paper.
Broccoli logic and minimal conditional logic
Minimal conditional logic (MCL) was studied by Stalnaker, Pollock, Burgess and Veltman to capture the idea that a conditional ϕ ⇒ ψ is true if an only if the conjunction ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is less possible than the conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ, and no more. Their modeling comes with a reflexive and transitive ≤-order for each world x and no spheres need occur. In a sphere system, two worlds lying on the same sphere agree on which worlds are farther away and which are closer. This assumption is dropped in MCL. Hence, if two worlds x and y are equally far away in the underlying order from the real world u and if the world z is farther away than the world y, no conclusions may be drawn as to whether world z is farther from the real world than world x, or vice versa. Instead of changing the onion picture by allowing non-linearly ordered sphere system as we wish to do in BL, MCL ignores spheres altogether. It has been a difficult task to find completeness for MCL, and we refer the reader to Burgess [3] for a detailed proof. This section will show how to avoid similar completeness difficulties with BL by showing that it is actually equivalent to MCL. Section 4.1 provides the MCL semantics, section 4.2 gives the complete proof system and section 4.3 shows the equivalence of MCL and BL.
Minimal conditional logic
A Minimal conditional logic model is a triple (U, R 3 , V), where U and V are as above, and R 3 is a ternary relation on U that respects reflexivity and transitivity (cf. [3] ). The relation Rxyz should be read as "according to world x, world y is no farther away than world z". We shall write the more suggestive y ≤ x z instead of Rxyz. We let W u = {y : ∃z, y ≤ x z} be the zone of entertainability for world u ∈ U. Intuitively, worlds outside the zone of entertainability for u are worlds so far away that their distance from the real world is not appreciable. The minimal conditional logic language contains a set of propositional variables, together with negation ¬, disjunction ∨ and a counterfactual modality [ϕ] for every formula ϕ. 
Notice that the semantic definition of [ϕ]ψ does not contain a minimality condition. However, if the model is finite and M, u [ϕ]ψ, then there is a minimal Figure 6 : Simple model such that [p] q is true at world u. The dotted arrows stand for sequences of ≤-related worlds.
world z ∈ U such that z ∈ V(ϕ) ∩ V(ψ). Since we will only use finite models for our equivalence result, we use the minimality formulation in evaluating [ϕ]ψ for the remainder of this paper. The semantic condition reduces to: ′ , and ψ is true at both worlds. Hence, ψ is true at every minimal ϕ-world. We turn to the proof system of MCL.
Proof system
The following set of axioms, with the same set of rules as for minimal relational logic presented in section 2.2, is complete for MCL (cf. 
As we can see from examples axiom (2) and examples 4.3 and 4.4, conditions (I), (M) and one direction of A of section 3 are derivable in MCL. We see at once that MCL has the properties we were looking for in BL (cf. 3), and we will now show that it can get all properties of BL. The general reason behind these considerations becomes clear in the next subsection.
Minimal conditional logic is broccoli logic
Let M = (U, R, V) be a finite MCL model. We will transform this model into a broccoli model, by constructing a broccoli flower at each world of M, taking the downward closed sets of worlds according to the underlying order (see picture 7).
More precisely, let C x (y) = {z ∈ U : z ≤ x y}, then BROC(x) = {C x (y) : y ∈ W x } is the induced broccoli at world x. In particular, since M is finite, the generalized limit condition of definition 1.2 holds. An induced broccoli model BROC(M) is then given by:
The semantics of [ϕ]ψ in the induced broccoli model is given by the following:
The main result of this section now follows from lemma 4.5. We are now ready for our main theorem. Proof. To show that MCL is BL, we need to show 1) that all axioms of section 4.1 are valid in BL, whose semantics was given in section 1 and 2) that if a principle is not derivable in MCL, then there is a broccoli countermodel.
Showing that the MCL axioms are valid in the BL-models of section 1 is straightforward. We show that axiom (5) is valid and leave the others to the reader. Let M be an arbitrary broccoli model and let u ∈ U be arbitrary. If ¬ ϕ]⊤ u, i.e., if there is no revision by ϕ, then the thesis is vacuously true. Hence, assume that there is a revision by ϕ. To show that if a principle is not provable in MCL, then there is a broccoli countermodel to ϕ, we use the completeness result of Burgess. If MCL ϕ for some ϕ, then there is a finite model M = (U, R, V) and a world u ∈ U such that M, u ϕ.
5 By lemma 4.5, BROC(M), u ϕ. Therefore, BROC(M) is a broccoli countermodel to ϕ. This completes the proof of theorem 4.6. Corollary 4.7. BL is decidable.
Conclusion
Our goal was to generalize onion semantics to capture relational belief revision; the result was BL. It turns out that BL is equivalent to a well-known conditional logic, the Burgess-Veltman minimal conditional logic. This is a fortunate outcome, as it saves a lot of work in coming up with a completeness result expanding on the minimal revisional logic of section 2. The major difficulty along the latter line was to devise an appropriate generalized arrow condition yielding generalized selection functions, and this is still an open question. Another open question is the role played by the [ϕ modality in BL: what is the complete minimal logic of [ϕ]ψ and [ϕ ψ over the Burgess-Veltman models? An advantage of MCL over BL is that it avoids the problem of choosing an appropriate generalized limit condition by dropping the sphere representation altogether. A lesson should be drawn here, namely that, as so often over the past years, we see that logics of belief revision are largely conditional logics.
